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Admittedly, oleomargarine legislation' discriminates in at least
three ways: (1) it protects the dairy industry by driving out the
manufacture and sale of oleomargarine within the state or by equal-
izing price competition between the sale of butter and the sale of
oleomargarine; (2) it protects local animal-fat industries by heavily
taxing oleomargarine not containing the statutory percentage of ani-
mal fat; and (3) it protects the United States oil and fat industry by
virtually prohibiting, as a practical matter, the use of foreign oils
and fats in oleomargarine products.2
The alleged original purpose of this legislation-the prevention
of fraud and deception in the sale of oleomargarine as butter 3-may
be achieved by laws regulating coloring, labeling, advertising, and by
the general pure food acts.4 Tax laws, however, comprise the bulk
of the modern statutory regulations of oleomargarine. With their
passage has come a concentration of oleomargarine production within
a smaller number of states and a significant rearrangement of the
distribution of licensed retail dealers. 5 The manufacture and sale
The federal government and every state except Arizona have enacted
oleomargarine legislation. These include provisions for excise taxes
on this product, license fees from manufacturers, wholesalers, re-
tailers, and others, and miscellaneous requirements as to coloring,
labeling, packaging, advertising, etc. See "Comparative Charts of
State Statutes Illustrating Barriers to Trade Between States,"
MARKETIN LAWS SURVEY W.P.A. (1939) pp. 32-45.
2 The most stringent oleomargarine legislati6n is to be found in the
great dairy states. Taxes on oleomargarine not containing a cer-
tain percentage of animal fat are levied by the important cattle-
producing states outside the cotton belt. Thirteen states imposing
excise taxes on oleomargarine containing foreign produced in-
gredients are important producers of vegetable oils and animal
fats.
3 Powell v. Pa., 127 U.S. 678 (1888); People v. Freeman, 242 Ill. 373,
90 N.E. 366 (1909).
4 The courts early accepted as a fact that oleomargarine is a whole-
some food product composed of the same elements as dairy butter
and equally nutritive. People v. Marx, 99 N.Y. 377 (1885); Schol-
lenberger v. Pa., 171 U.S. 1 (1898). Today, dispute centers about
their respective vitamin content.
5 In the year 1936-37, Illinois, Ohio, New Jersey and California pro-
duced more than three-fourths of the national output and only
nine other states reported production. Of the four main producers,
only California requires license fees from manufacturers and deal-
ers, and these are small, and none of them impose excise taxes on
the sale of oleomargarine made from domestic materials. The
shifts and changes of licensed retail dealers throughout the coun-
try may be illustrated by the fact that from 1928, when no state
excise taxes existed, to 1937, when excise taxes were in effect in
half of the states, those states having excise taxes on all uncolored
oleomargarine showed an average drop in the number of retail
licenses of 81%, and those states imposing taxes only on oleo-
margarine containing imported ingredients showed a 60% increase
in licenses. See "State and Federal Legislation and Decisions Re-
lating to Oleomargarine," pp. 11-14 (1939), published by the Bu-
reau of Agricultural Economics of the U. S. Dept. of Agriculture.
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of oleomargarine products have almost disappeared or have seriously
diminished in many states and the ingredients used in their manu-
facture in other states have greatly changed.
Do these statutes constitute trade barriers between states? In-
terstate trade barriers refer to obstructions to free trade between
states. Such obstructions frequently operate against products pro-
duced out-of-state for the protection of similar products manufactured
or produced within the state. If the barrier is against a product
which is capable of or is actually being produced within the state as
well as in other states, and is for the protection of a competing pro-
duct locally produced, then it is an industry barrier rather than a
geographic one. True, where the state making the discrimination in
favor of a product of which it is a large producer and is incapable
of or is not producing the product being discriminated against the
barrier appears to be interstate. But considering the purpose for
which these laws were passed, it is apparent that they still are fun-
damentally inter-industry barriers, although they may operate prac-
tically as inter-state barriers.7 In as much as the favored product
may be shipped into the state from other sources of production without
being subject to any tax burden it is clear that the discrimination
i n these statutes is against the product rather than against extra-
state competition. Thus it seems apparent that the oleomargarine
laws create inter-industry barriers rather than inter-state barriers.
0 License taxes are imposed on manufacturers by 9 states, on whole-
salers by 16 states, on retailers by 13 states, on restaurants and
boarding houses by 6 states, and on consumers by 1 state. In
addition, 32 states make some prohibition as to the use of color,
and 24 states levy an excise tax on the product. Ten states levy
both license fees and excise taxes.
7 Some of these statutes may indirectly operate so as to discriminate
against a state's own sellers and consumers where oleomargarine,
manufactured in a state which exacts a high excise tax on such
products sold therein but which specifically exempts products
to be shipped outside the state, is sold for exportation into a neigh-
boring state levying no excise taxes. Residents of the former
may go into the latter state to purchase oleomargarine and thus
avoid the tax in their own state, although accessible and eco-
nomical marketing areas greatly restrict the extent of such out-
of-state purchases. Similar discrimination may exist where a
state requires a manufacturer's license fee and levies no excise
tax on the sale of such products. Such statutes may tend to dis-
courage in-state manufacture and encourage manufacturers in
other states to ship products into the state, but wholesalers' and
retailers' license fees may tend to discourage the sale therein
without regard to the source of manufacture.
8 There is no problem as to oleomargarine in Indiana except insofar as
Indiana manufacturers and distributors may encounter tax bur-
dens imposed by other states in which they do business. The In-
diana statute (IND. STAT. ANN. (BURNs 1933) §§ 35-1401 to 35-1408)
contains only moderate regulations as to labeling, posting signs
in public eating places, and prohibition of the use of words or sym-
bols commonly used in the sale of butter. No restrictions are laid
down as to color, and no taxes of any kind are levied. Apparently
the dairy producers in Indiana feel no need for artificial protection
or adjustment in the competition of their products with oleomar-
garine.
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And these industry barriers created by the discriminatory treat-
ment of competing products have been sustained when attacked on
grounds of due process, equal protection, and privilege and immuni-
ties violation.9 The United States Supreme Court early held that a
state could prohibit entirely the manufacture and sale of oleomargar-
ine within its borders,o but that oleomargarine unadulterated, being
a lawful article of commerce, a state could not exclude its importa-
tion and sale in the original package.1 The manufacture and sale
within12 and shipment intoll the state of oleomargarine colored to
look like butter may be forbidden. The federal government may levy
a nominal tax on uncolored oleomargarine and a very high tax on
artificially colored oleomargarine,' 4 and a state may levy a virtually
prohibitive excise tax on the sale of even uncolored oleomargarine
within the state.15
Most classifications of persons and products made in the exer-
cise of the police and taxing powers have been upheldl e due to the
wide legislative discretioni- in classification. Some police power cases
have held the legislative classification arbitrary and unreasonable and
9 Powell v. Pa., 127 U.S. 678 (1888) (due process and equal protection
under 14th Amendment); accord, Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio,
183 U.S. 288 (1902). McCray v. U.S., 195 U.S. 27 (1904) (federal
due process under 5th Amendment). A. Magnano Co. v. Ham-
ilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934) (due process under 14th Amendment).
In Plumley v. Mass, 155 U.S. 461 (1894) (plaintiff contended
among other things that statute violated privileges and immuni-
ties clause. The court held only valid question presented was
that concerning the commerce clause).
10 Powell v. Pa., 127 U.S. 678 (1888). But see People v Marx, 99
N.Y. 377 (1885) and John F. Jelke v. Emery, 193 Wis. 311, 214
N.W. 369 (1927).
11 Schollenberger v. Pa., 171 U.S. 1 (1898); accord, Collins v. N.H.,
171 U.S. 80 (1898). In 1902 an amendment to the federal Oleo-
margarine Act of 1886 made all oleomargarine subject to the
laws of the state into which it is transported. 32 STAT. 193 (1902),
21 U.S.C. §25 (1934).
12 Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, 183 U.S. 238 (1902).
18 Plumley v. Mass., 155 U.S. 461 (1894).
'
4 McCray v. U.S., 195 U.S. 27 (1904).
15 A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton. 292 U.S. 40 (1934). But cf. Field
Packing Co. v. Glenn, 5 F. Supp. 4 (D. Ky. 1933), affirmed
with certain modification in 290 U.S. 177 (1933).
16 "A very wide discretion must be conceded to the legislative power
of the State in the classification of trades, callings, businesses
or occupations which may be subjected to special forms of regula-
tion or taxation through an excise or license tax." Brown-Forman
Co. v. Ky., 217 U.S. 563, 573 (1910). See also Fountain Park
Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N.E. 465 (1927).
17Polce power: Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61(1911); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915); Bolivar Township
v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N.E. 158 (1934); Gerlot v. Swartz,
212 Ind. 292, 7 N.E. (2d) 960 (1937). Taxing power: Bell's Gap
R. Co. v. Pa., 184 U.S. 282 (1890); State Board of Tax Comm'rs
v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931); State v. Welsh, 61 S.D. 593, 251
N.W. 189 (1933).
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that no reasonable relaton existed between the regulation and the
purported objective of promoting the public health, safety, morals or
welfare.' 8 Where the act discloses on its face an attempt to prohibit
entirely, the production or use of a lawful article or the conduct of
a lawful business the courts will hold such measures invalid.19 But
the courts are less inclined to question the validity of classification
for tax purposes. License and excise taxes affecting discriminations
between producers of the same product,20 between persons rendering
identical services, 21 and between products directly competing with each
other 22 have been upheld. Thus, it is apparent that the United States
Supreme Court will continue to sustain oleomargarine legislation, 23
and leave to the interplay of economic forces such relief as they can
obtain.
S.C.
is State v. Wiggam, 187 Ind. 159, 118 N.E. 684 (1918); Davis Con-
struction Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 192 Ind. 144, 132 N.E. 629
(1921); Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N.E. 465
(1927); and see cases cited post, note 17.
Weaver v. Palmer Bros., 270 U.S. 402 (1926) (Pennsylvania statute
prohibited use of shoddy in the making of comfortables); Liggett
Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928) (Pennsylvania statute for-
bade corporation to own any additional drug stores unless all its
stockholders were licensed pharmacists); Atl. Refining Co. v.
Trumbull, 43 F. (2d) 154 (D. Con..1930) (Connecticut statute
prohibited sale of motor vehicle lubricating oil not complying with
specified government standards); J. H. McLeaish & Co. v. Bin-
ford, 52 F. (2d) 151 (S. D. Texas 1931), aff'd 284 U.S. 589
(1932) (Texas statute prohibited operation of vehicles carrying
over ten bales of uncompressed cotton on public highways).20Alaska Fish Co. v. Smith, 255 U.S. 44 (1921) (Alaska statute im-
posed license taxes upon manufacture of oil and fertilizer from
herring but not upon those who used other fish or salmon offal
in such manufacture). Said the court at p. 48: "Even if the tax
should destroy a business it would not be made invalid or require
compensation upon that ground alone. Those who enter upon a
business take that risk."
21 Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59 (1912) (Montana statute
required a license fee of all persons engaged in laundry business
other than the steam laundry business). Said the court at p. 62,
speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes: "If the State sees fit to
encourage steam laundries and discourage hand laundries that
is its own affair."22 Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922) (Pennsylvania
statute taxes anthracite coal but not bituminous coal). The court
held that the commercial competition between the two products is
not a sufficient reason against classifying them separately for
taxation purposes.
23 The differences between butter and oleomargarine are sufficient
to justify their separate classification for taxation purposes. A.
Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934). Said the court
at p. 47: ". . . the single premise that the amount of the tax
is so excessive that it will bring about the destruction of ap-
pellant's business, . . . , standing alone, this court heretofore
has uniformly rejected as furnishing no juridical ground for
striking down a taxing act." For an attempted economic justifi-
cation of the discrimination and a suggestion that the tax on
oleomargarine may be merely equalizing the tax burden already
imposed on the farmer and dairy industry, see the Magnano case
in the lower court, A. Magnano Co. v. Dunbar, 2 F. Supp. 417
(W.D. Wash. 1933).
